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Morgan: Misprison of Felony

MISPRISION OF FELONY
1

Misprision of felony has been defined in various ways, but perhaps its best definition is as follows: "Misprision of felony at
common law is a criminal neglect either to prevent a felony from
being committed or to bring the offender to justice after its commission, but without such previous concert with or subsequent assistance of him as will make the concealer an accessory before or after
12
the fact."
In the modern use of the term, misprision of felony has been said
to be almost, if not identically, the same offense as that of an accessory after the fact. 3 It has also been stated that misprision is nothing
more than a word used to describe a misdemeanor which does not
possess a specific name. 4 It is that offense of concealing a felony
committed by another, but without such previous concert with or
subsequent assistance to the felon as would make the concealing party
an accessory before or after the fact.5
Misprision is distinguished from compounding an offense on the
basis of consideration or amends; misprision is a bare concealment of
crime, while compounding is a concealment for a reward by one
6
directly injured by the crime.
History of Misprision
In order to better understand the development of the crime of misprision of felony, one should remember that at common law crimes
were divided into misdemeanors, felonies, and treason.7 There was
1. A term derived from the old French, mespris, a neglect or contempt.

B1. Comm. 119.
2. 16 C. J., § 13.

4

3. State v. Graham, 190 La. 669, 182 So. 711 (1938).

4. United States v. Perlstein, 126 F. 2d 789 (3rd Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316
U. S. 678 (1942). The word misprision is sometimes employed to denote "all
such high offences as are under the degree of capital, but nearly bordering thereon. The term 'high misdemeanor', however, better conveys this meaning, while
the precision of our language is promoted by restricting 'misprision' to neglects;
and such, it is believed, is the better modem usage." 1 BIsHoP, CRIMIINAL

LAW, § 717 (7th ed. 1882).
5. Black's Law Dict.1194 (3rd ed. 1933).
6. Fountain v. Bigham, 235 Pa. 35, 84 Atl. 131 (1912); 1 Hawkins P. C.
c. 59, § 5; 4 BI. Comm. 133. Compounding a felony is that offense committed by a
person who, having been directly injured by a felony, agrees with the criminal

that he will not prosecute him, on condition of the latter's making reparation,
or on receipt of a reward or bribe not to prosecute. Black's Law Dict. 382
(3rd ed. 1933).
7. For discussion, see 1 BIsHoP, CRIMINAI, LAW, § 609 (7th ed. 1882).

For

discussion of the classification of crimes as felonies and misdemeanors, see 5
S. C. L. Q. 59 (1952).
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no such crime as misprision of a misdemeanor, only of felony and of
treason. Every act of treason constituted a felony, but treason, by
its very nature, was considered to be of a higher degree of crime
than other types of felonies, and it was thus classified apart.8 A
discussion of misprision of treason is necessary to help one better
understand misprision of felony, since the former is included in the
latter, but generally punished more severely. Misprision of treason,
which was a high misdemeanor and not a felony, was divided into
two sorts: negative, which consisted in the concealment of something which ought to be revealed; and positive, 9 which consisted of
something which ought not to be done.
Of the negative kind,
bare knowledge and concealment of treason, without any degree
of assent thereto, prior to the Statute 1 and 2 Phil. and Mary, c. 10,
was a capital crime, but by the statute was made only a misprision.
But if there were any probable circumstances of assent, as if one
went to a treasonable meeting, knowing beforehand that a conspiracy
was intended against the king; or, being in such company once by
accident, and having heard such treasonable conspiracy, met the
same company again and heard more of it, but concealed it; this was
an implied assent in law, and made the concealer guilty of actual
high treason.10
There was also one positive misprision of treason, created by the
Statute 13 Eliz., c. 2 and Statute 14 Eliz., c. 3, which made the
forging of coin, not current in England, a misprision of treason.11
Other misprisions of treason, which were merely positive, were generally denominated contempts or high misdemeanors, consisting of such
crimes as: (1) mal-administration, the punishment usually consisting of banishment, imprisonment, fines, or perpetual disability; (2)
contempts against the king's prerogative, as by refusing to assist
him for the good of the public, punishable by fine and imprisonment,
at the court's discretion; (3) contempts against the king's person
and government, as by speaking or writing against the king or the
government, punishable by fine and imprisonment and also the pil8. Except treason, crime is either a felony

O'Shields, 163 S. C. 408, 161 S. E. 692 (1931).

or misdemeanor.

State v.

9. In Coke's time the term had gotten an extended meaning; it was not merely a crime of omission, but a crime of commission. 3 Co. Inst. 139. A contempt or a high misdemeanor was a positive misprision, but in modern usage
positive misprisions are limited to neglects. 2 Cooiszv, BLACKSTONE 1300 (4th
ed. 1899).
10. 1 Hawkins P. C. 56.
11. By subsequent statutes the offense was made a felony, or in case of copper
coin, a misdemeanor. 2 CooLY, BLACKSTONE 1299, n. 2 (4th ed. 1899).
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lory12 or other infamous corporal punishment; (4) contempts against
the king's title, not amounting to treason, punishable by fine and
imprisonment; (5) contempts against the king's palaces or courts
of justice, punishable by death under the ancient law before the
conquest, but later punished by imprisonment and fine; and if blood
were drawn by any striking in the king's palace, wherein his royal
person resided, punishment at the king's pleasure and also the loss of
the offender's right hand; (6) threatening a judge, which is a high
misprision and punished with large fines, imprisonment, and corporal
punishment; (7) threatening or assaulting a party who is under the
protection of a court, punishable by fine and imprisonment, and,
(8) dissuading witnesses from giving evidence, or to advise a prisoner
to stand mute, which are impediments of justice, and high misprisions,
and punishable by fine and imprisonment.18
Misprision of felony 14 was originally an offense or misdemeanor
akin to felony, but involving a lesser degree of guilt, and those
found guilty were not liable to the capital penalty. As various statutes1 5 stated that concealment of a person's knowledge of treasonable actions or designs should be regarded as misprision of treason,
this term came to be used as the ordinary designation for such concealment. Hence it was often supposed that the word misprision
16
itself expressed the sense of failure to denounce a crime.
Misprision of felony cases, in England as well as in the United
States, are rather rare cases, 17 probably due to the reluctance of
prosecutors to prosecute such type cases and to the difficulty of obtaining the necessary evidence needed to prove a misprision. Most
of the English cases mentioning misprision deal with either compounding offenses or misprision of treason, and only mention mis12. Abolished by Statute I Vic., c. 23.
13. 2 COOLrY,_BLACxSTONr 1299-1304 (4th ed. 1899).

14. See Proceedings Under a Special Commission for the County of York,
31 State Tr. (1813), the charge of Thompson, B., at p. 969.
15. Act 25 Hen. VIII, c. 22 § 9 (1533-34) provided: "If any person . . .
being com-maunded . . . to take the seid othe . . . obstynatlly refuse that to
doo . . . that every suche refusall shalbe . . . adjudged mesprysion of high
treason." Act 5 and 6 Edw. VI, c. 11 (1512) provided also ". . . that con-

cealment or keping secrete of any Highe Treason be deemed and taken only
mysprision of Treason." Act 14 Eliz. c. 3 (1572) provided: "That yf any
person or persons hereafter . . . counterfayte any suche kind of coygne . . .
as is not the proper Coigne of this Realme ... That then everye suche Offence
shalbee deemed and adjudged mysprision of Highe Treason."
16. The Oxford English Dict. 523 (1933).
17. There has been no prosecution for this offense for many years. The
expression "misprision of felony" has "somevhat passed into desuetude."
Williams v. Bayley, L. R. 1 H. L. 200, 220 (1866), per Lord Westbury.
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prision of felony by way of dicta.' 8 In England there is no modern
instance of any prosecution either for misprision of treason or for
misprision of felony. 19 The crime is practically obsolete everywhere.
Misprision of felony remains a common-law crime in some of the
States2 0 of the United States. In other states it is supplemented by
22
statute2 ' or does not exist at all.

Congress has made misprision of felony a crime.2 3 Under the
Federal statute,2 4 one having and concealing knowledge of the
actual commission of a felony and not reporting it as soon as possible
to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under
the United States, is guilty of misprision. 25 The felony must be
one which is cognizable by a court of the United States. Misdemeanors are not included in this Act,2 6 but by a reclassification of offenses from misdemeanors to felonies, crimes were brought within
the operation of the Act.27 However, if the crime were not an
28
offense at common law, no charge of misprision could be sustained.
There have been very few cases in the United States involving
18. Scrope's Case, 3 Co. Inst. 36 (1415); Williams v. Bayley, L. R. 1 H. L.

200 (1866) ; Rex v. Cowper, 5 Mod. Rep. 206, 87 E. R. 611 (1696) ; Regicides'
Case, 5 State Tr. 947, Kel 7, 10; 84 E. R. 1056 (1660); Rex v. Tonge, 6
State Tr. 225, Kel. 17; 84 E. R. 1061 (1662); Rex v. Thwing & Pressicks,
7 State Tr. 1161 (1680) ; Rex v. Walcot, 9 State Tr. 519 (1683).
19. 9 HALSBuRY, LAws OF ENGLAND 48 n. 1 (2d ed. 1933).
20. Carpenter v. State, 62 Ark. 286, 36 S. W. 900 (1896) ; State v. Wilson,

67 At. 533 (Vt. 1907).

21. DXLAWARS REV. CODz 1915, § 4720, where misprision of felony is declared
to be a misdemeanor. See State v. Biddle, 124 At. 804 (Del. 1923), where it
is said that the common-law definition of "misprision of felony" (the criminal
neglect to either prevent a felony or to bring the offender to justice after its
commission, but without such previous concert with or subsequent assistance as
would make the concealer an accessory) applies in Delaware.
22. People v. Lefkovitz, 293 N. W. 642 (Mich. 1940), states that the common-law offense of misprision of a felony does not exist in Michigan.
23. 62 STAT. 684, c. 645, § 1, of June 25, 1948 based on § 251 of former Title
18 (Act Mar. 4, 1909, c. 321, § 146, 35 STAT. 1114).
24. The statutes of the United States make punishable both misprision of
felony, (REv. STAT., § 5390) and misprision of treason (Id. § 5333). against the
general government.
25. The punishment is a fine of not more than Five Hundred Dollars or imprisonment not more than three years, or both.
26. Presont v. United States, 281 Fed. 131 (6th Cir. 1922) ; Neal v. United
States, 102 F. 2d 643 (8th Cir. 1939).
27. United States v. Kent, 36 F. 2d 401 (S. D. Ill. 1929), where under
§ 1 (27 USCA, § 91) of the Jones Act (27 USCA, §§ 91, 92) are classified
as felonies many of the liquor law violations formerly classified as misdemeanors.
28. See United States v. Brandenburg, 144 F. 2d 656, 154 A.L.R. 1160 (3rd
Cir. 1944), where it was held that the defendant, who concealed knowledge
of another's flight from North Carolina to escape prosecution from burglary
with explosives, which flight was not an offense within the purview of the
Fugitive Felon Act because the prosecution was for an offense unknown to
the common law, was not guilty of misprision of felony.
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misprision of felony. Michigan2 9 has rejected the crime entirely.
Louisiana,3 0 while not rejecting the crime, has quashed a bill of information charging an accused with the offense of misprision committed in another state, holding the offense not cognizable by the
courts of Louisiana. Other states which have had misprision cases
before them or occasion to mention the offense are Arkansas, 31 Vermont,8 2 Alabama,8 and Delaware.3 4 McClain in his treatise on
Criminal Law stated:
* and perhaps not a single case can be cited in which punishment for such connection with a felony has been inflicted in
the United States. If such criminal liability is recognized in
any form it is by statute making particular acts of that character substantive offenses rather than by the preservation of the
common-law doctrine of misprision of felony.8 5
General Considerations
A question which arises in the consideration of the topic "misprision of felony" is to what extent is one bound to act to prevent
himself from committing a misprision. At common law, and it is
still true today, one was under a duty to prevent the commission of
a felony about to be committed in his presence, 8 or to arrest the
felon after the commission- of a felony within his presence. If he
failed to do so, he was guilty of a misprision. 37 And one was bound
at common law to either report the commission of a felony to the
proper authorities3 s or to prosecute the felon. If he failed to do
29. "The old-time common-law offense of misprision of felony, short of an

accessory after the fact (if there ever was such a crime, which is extremely
doubtful because wholly unsupported by adjudications in England), is not
now a substantive offense and not adopted by the Constitution, because wholly
unsuited to American criminal law and procedure as used in this State." People
v. Lefkovitz, 293 N. W. 642 (Mich. 1940).
30. State v. Graham, 190 La. 669, 182 So. 711 (1938).
31. Carpenter v. State, 62 Ark. 286, 36 S.W. 900 (1896).
32. State v. Wilson, 67 AtI. 533 (Vt. 1907).
33. Suell v. Derricott, 49 So. 895 (Ala. 1909).
34. State v. Biddle, 124 Atl. 804 (Del. 1923).
35. 2 M cCLAIN, CRMINAL LAW § 938.

36. "The law will not be astute in searching for a line of demarcation be-

tween the lawful ... , and ...
illegal acts of individuals in the ...
prevention of crime, ... as will take an innocent citizen ...
from the protection of
the law . . .". Ruloff v. People, 45 N. Y. 213 (1871).

37. See State v. Biddle, 124 Atl. 804 (Del. 1923), where the Delaware court
said that all that was required for a conviction of misprision of felony was
that the defendant, a woman, need only stand by while a man attacked another
man and robbed him, and wilfully fail and neglect to prevent such robbery,
or wilfully fail and neglect to make any effort to prosecute the robber.
38. "A man is bound to discover the crime to a magistrate wi~h all possible
expedition." 1 RussELr,, CRimrs 45 (3rd Eng. ed. 1857).
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either, he was guilty of a misprision. 9 Such concealment of the
commission of the felony under the Federal misprision statute must
be more than just a failure to report or prosecute. Mere silence
after knowledge of the commission of the crime is not sufficient to
amount to "misprision of felony", but there must be some affirmative
act toward its concealment. 40 Just what that act must consist of
cannot be clearly ascertained from the cases, but it seems to be some
act which falls between mere silence or failure to disclose the felony,
and an act in aid of an offender of such nature as to constitute one
an accessory after the fact. In United States v. Perlstein,4 1 the
court said that a misprision of felony is the concealment of a felony
without givIng any degree of maintenance to the felon. And in
Bratton v. United States, 42 the court said that the indictment for
misprision must allege more than mere failure to disclose, such as
suppression of evidence, harboring of the criminal, intimidation of
witnesses, or other positive act designed to conceal from authorities
the commission of a felony. It seems that such acts would also be
sufficient to make one an accessory to the offense. The case of Neal
v. United States4 3 held that the elements of statutory misprision of
felony, both of which must be proved to support conviction, are
concealment of something, such as suppression of the evidence or
other positive act, and failure to disclose. For example, in the case
4A it was said that knowledge and failure
of United States v. Farrar,
to report whiskey sales of the seller by the buyer was not a sufficient affirmative act of concealment to charge the buyer with the crime
of misprision. And in the case of Donovan v. United States,45
it was said that the defendant by remaining silent while sentence
was imposed on him and another person whom he knew was sub39. When one had suffered from a felony, he could not maintain against
the felon a civil action for the injury, until he had discharged his duty to the
public by carrying on, or at least by setting on foot, a criminal prosecution for
the public wrong. I BisHor, CIUMNAL LAW, § 267 (7th ed. 1882), wherein
it is stated that this is the English rule, followed by some American jurisdictions. See Martin v. Martin, 25 Ala. 201; Pettingill v. Rideout, 6 N. H. 454.
However, South Carolina does not follow the English rule. See Cannon v.
Burris, 1 Hill (S. C.) 372 (1833); Robinson v. Culp, 1 Tread 231, 3 Brev.
(S. C.) 302 (1812).
40. United States v. Farrar, 38 F. 2d 515 (1st Cir. 1930), aff'd, 281 U. S.
624 (1930) ; Donovan v. United States, 54 F. 2d 193 (3rd Cir. 1931). An intention to conceal the commission of a felony from the government, if not
carried out, is not statutory misprision of felony. Neal v. United States, 102
F. 2d 643 (8th Cir. 1939).
41. 126 F. 2d 789 (3rd Cir. 1941).
42. 73 F. 2d 795 (10th Cir. 1934).
43. 102 F. 2d 643 (8th Cir. 1939).
44. 38 F. 2d 515 (1st Cir. 1930).
45. 54 F. 2d 193 (3rd Cir. 1931).
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stituting for the real co-defendant was not guilty under the Misprision of Felony Act. It seems, therefore, that even though one
is under a duty to report or prosecute a felony committed within
his presence, he is not liable for misprision if he fails to carry out
his duty. 46 There must be some affirmative neglect, if it can be
called such, on his part, or, as Chitty says, "he will be guilty of mis47
prision of the crime which he has been instrumental in concealing."
How much a man, to avoid the guilt of misprision, must do
to prevent a crime, or bring the offender to punishment, it is
difficult to state; and doubtless the rule will vary with the nature and magnitude of the offense, and the kind and degree of
public provision made for searching out and prosecuting offenders. 48
At common law only those are disqualified from becoming prosecutors who either from religious scruples or infidelity, which render
them incapable of taking an oath, or from infamy, which presumes
them unworthy of credit, are incompetent to become witnesses. Of
this description are:
*..

Quakers, infidels who have no ideas of God or a future

state of retribution, and persons attained of felony, treason, or
false verdict, or convicted of any species of crimen falsi which
renders them infamous. All these parties, however, are perfectly at liberty to disclose the circumstances of the crime, and thereby enable others to bring an offender to justice, against whom
they cannot themselves give evidence. 49
Persons legally entitled to prefer an accusation against a party
are in general
S..

bound by the strongest obligations, both of reason and

law, to exert the power with which they are invested. Revenge
ought not to become the motive of their actions. But in cases
of greater offenses, which affect the public, they have no power
46. "It is true that under the English common law it was made the duty of
every citizen to disclose any treason or felony of which he had knowledge
and a person who did not fulfill this duty was guilty of 'misprision of treason
or felony' though no affirmative effort or attempt was made to conceal the
crime. But the early federal statute and the law of the present day expressly
require concealment in addition to knowledge and failure to report, to constitute
the crime of 'misprision of felony'." MERE FAILURE TO REPORT
FELONY NOT A CRIME. 63 U. S. L. Rev. 621, 622 (1929).
47. 1 CHrnry, CRimixAT, LAw, 2, 3 (1819).
48. 1 BisHop, CRIMINA, LAw, § 721 (7th ed. 1882).
49. 1 CialTY, CImixNA. LAW 2 (1819).
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(right) to forgive the injury which society in general has sustained, or to deprive mankind of that security which can alone
result from the prompt detection and punishment of those by
whom it is broken.5 0
Conclusion
If the crime of misprision were strictly enforced today, there
might arise many interesting problems. For example, following the
duty to prevent felony to its logical conclusion, would one be under
a duty to kill a man in order to prevent his committing suicide?
There is a duty to prevent a commission of a felony, even to the extent of killing if necessary, 51 and if one failed to carry out his duty,
he would be chargeable with a misprision. In answer to this problem, first, it might be questioned whether committing suicide is a
felony. Generally, felonies are defined by the punishment meted out,
and no punishment may be inflicted upon one who successfully accomplishes suicide. And, secondly, in view of the fact that one must
commit an affirmative act of concealment to be guilty of misprision,
more than a mere witnessing of the suicide might be required before
the witness would be legally compelled to act.
Another problem might arise in those states which require one,
when feloniously attacked, to retreat to the wall before killing an
attacker, if that be the only way to prevent such attack.52 If a man
murderously attacked by another flies instead of resisting, he commits, substantially, misprision of felony, even though in strict law
he will be excused, because acting from the commendable motive of
saving life.53 So, if he flees, that is, retreats to the wall, he commits a misprision of felony for not apprehending the attacker. If
he stays to apprehend the attacker, he violates his duty of retreating
to the wall. In answer to this problem, it can be said that as a prac50. Ibid.
S. "It is held to be the duty of every one who sees a felony attempted by

violence, to prevent it if possible; and in the performance of this duty, which
is an active one, there is a legal right to use all necessary means to make the
resistance effectual." Pond v. People, 8 Mich. 150 (1860). See also State v.
Harris, 1 Jones (N. C.) 190; State v. Moore, 31 Conn. 479 (1863) ; State v.
Turlington, 102 Mo. 642, 15 S. W. 141 (1891).
52. At common law one need not retreat to the wall if the attack be felonious.
CLARK'S, CRnaNAT, LAw, 139, 140 (1894). However, in some states, the law
requires, under all circumstances, that a man retreat before taking the life of
his assailant, unless in some cases where he is attacked in his dwelling house,
or unless by retreating he has no probable means of escape, State v. Foster,
66 S. C. 469, 45 S. E. 1 (1903); or, unless by so doing he would probably
endanger his safety. State v. Jones, 90 S. C. 290, 73 S. E. 177 (1911).
53. 1 Bisuor, Cbin-TAr, LAW, §§ 851, 849 (7th ed. 1882).
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tical matter, one would not be prosecuted for misprision under such
circumstances. And certainly one would not be held responsible
for doing the very thing which it is a crime to fail to do.Whether the common-law crime of misprision should be retained
today, as it is in some of our states, or whether it should be left up
to the legislative branch of government to decide whether it should
exist, is difficult to say. Certainly we do not need any laws such as
those old laws of Egypt, whereby "whoever had it in his power to
save the life of a citizen and neglected that duty, was punished as a
murderer."5 5 Such a law in our society would be regarded as more
than severe. Neither would it seem that our society would permit
enforcement of or punishment for every dereliction of one's duty.
The appropriate observation on this point was made by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Brooks,58 where he stated: "It may
be the duty of a citizen to accuse every offender, and proclaim
every offense which comes to his knowledge; but the law which would
punish him in every case, for not performing this duty, is too harsh
for man."

Common-law misprision has largely outlived any usefulness it may
have had in times where conditions were more anarchical and law enforcement by government agents was less sophisticated and clearly
more difficult of accomplishment. Certainly with the growth of our
modern-day police systems and methods of crime detection, there
is little need today for making misprision a crime, except in particular,
specified types of crimes in which the public would have a great interest. The citizen's duty set out in misprision is certainly of a high
political and moral character, but any punishment for failure to carry
out this duty would seem to be best determined by the, legislative
branch of government, rather than under common-law rules which
arose in answer to problems of a society very different from our own.
E. Liz MORGAN.

54. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 220 (1944), a case concerning

alleged conflicting orders given by the military, which forbade defendant both

to leave an area and to remain there, in which it was said by Mr. Justice Black,
in delivering the majority opinion of the court, that ". . . a person cannot be
convicted for doing the very thing which it is a crime to fail to do."

55. 1 TYvm, HisToRy 37 (Boston ed. 1844).
56. 7 Wheat. 556, 20 U. S. 556, 575, 5 L.Rd. 522 (1820).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1953

9

